Japan has faced two major challenges during the past 15 years: building new sources of competitive advantage and revitalizing the economy. To meet these challenges, the government has, since the mid-1990s, developed social systems to better commercialize intellectual properties, resources, and assets that academic institutions own by means of collaborative research, technology transfer, and academic spin-offs. This study presents an overview of this institutional revolution and reports some early outcomes by using results from two recently conducted major surveys. We also assess the achievements of these efforts, which lead us to point out remaining problems and challenges that policy makers and academic institutions need to overcome. The initial indication of the progress is promising, but some critical questions remain.
Introduction
Japan has faced two major challenges during the past 15 years. The first challenge has been to find new sources of competitive advantage, replacing traditional strength in high-quality, lowcost production systems. Several of the manufacturing industries have established a dominant presence in global competitive markets, making a major contribution to the prosperity of Japan's economy with the great strength in low inventory cost and low defect rates.
Representative examples of such industries include shipbuilding, automobile assembly, home electric appliances, and audiovisual devices. However, since the late 1980s, these industries have received severe competitive pressures from East Asia and particularly China, with the improved quality of low-cost manpower in labor-intensive industries. The emergence of this new economic order poses an urgent and crucial concern for Japanese society to find new additional sources of competitive advantage.
The second challenge has been to revitalize the economy. After the bubble economy burst in 1991, the major indicators have consistently signaled serious economic slumps in the past 10 to 15 years. As shown in Figure 1 , the drop of the GDP growth rates indicates a consistent downward structural change of Japan's economy since 1991. 1 The average nominal GDP growth rate from 1991 to 2003 was only 0.97%, compared with 6.22% from 1981 to 1990.
The figure also shows that the nominal GDP growth rate was less than the growth in real GDP.
The average of real GDP growth rates was 3.95% from 1981 to 1990, whereas that from 1991 to 2003 was 1.33%. These figures suggest that Japan's economy has suffered from deflation in the last decade-further evidence of the severity of Japan's economic stagnation. Moreover, the unemployment rate which peaked at an average of 5.4% in 2002 and 2003 sharply increased in the period, more than doubling the average of 2.1% in 1990 (see Figure 2 ). It has therefore been an urgent task for the Japanese industrial society to create new industries and jobs by reforming traditional business systems that retard the process of adaptation to dynamically changing global 1 Figure 1 shows the results of 93SNA (fixed-based, base year = 1995). We choose not to use the most recent version of the SNA but the latter for long-term comparison.
competitive environments.
=====FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE===== =====FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE=====
The implementation of typical fiscal and monetary policies has failed to stimulate the stagnating economy. Persistent public overspending by the Japanese government through this period caused the highly accumulated fiscal deficits, which now pose great uncertainty for the future. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2 , the Bank of Japan has ventured into bold monetary policies for monetary easing. Here, the overnight call rate refers to a short-term interbank interest rate, and the main policy interest rate in Japan is comparable with the Federal Funds rate in the US. To reactivate corporate financing, the Bank of Japan has kept setting the policy interest rates to zero, the lowest level any central bank can set, but this monetary policy also did not have substantial impact on revitalization of the economy.
Facing such a severe economic situation, the government has planned to overcome these challenges by building the nation's competitive advantage upon the discovery of scientific knowledge, the innovation of new technologies and services, and the commercialization of both of these aspects. While large corporations certainly have more resources for research and development (R&D) activities that require intensive capital investment, new ventures and smallto-medium enterprises are considered to be more competent for innovation because of their flexibility and speed. Departing from traditional industrial policies that offered favorable resource environments for large corporations, the government now recognizes the possibilities of vigorous growth of new ventures, providing financial support to innovation in the areas of new-business research and new products/technologies/service development by the enactment of the Creative Business Promotion Law in 1995 (Bird and Mitsuhashi, 2003; Harada and Honjo, 2005) . Further, in 1999 the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law was fundamentally amended to incorporate the fostering of entrepreneurship. In parallel, the government has developed social systems that enable new ventures to procure capital for their growth and operations by opening stock exchange markets for entrepreneurial firms (e.g., 'Mothers' on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Japan (later reformed to 'Hercules') on the Osaka Stock Exchange).
As a part of the plan for building a nation with strengths in innovation, the government has also adopted policies to utilize the knowledge, assets, and intellectual property of academic institutions for commercialization. The nationwide turmoil by university students on many campuses in the early 1970s suggested close but murky connections between industrial corporations and university researchers, resulting in the substantial segregation of academia from business communities. Subsequently, the anticommercial norms restricted the utilization of on-campus scientific knowledge for business and economies through cross-field research collaboration, licensing for technology transfer, and academic spin-offs. However, the policy challenges discussed above now generate social pressures to increase the permeability of boundaries between academics and industries. In addition, Japanese corporations facing today's highly competitive global environments do not have sufficient resources to allocate to long-term, highly uncertain basic research projects. For these reasons, academic institutions in Japan are now expected to play a more significant role than ever in leading the nation's policies by developing technologies, products, services, and industries from their cutting-edge scientific knowledge.
As a study on the relationships between the institutional environment and entrepreneurship, this paper focuses on the emergence of academic spin-offs in Japan. We first present a snapshot of the historical transition of the legal and political environments that facilitate the commercialization of assets and resources owned by academic institutions. We also explicate three commercialization approaches, including cross-field research collaboration, licensing for technology transfer, and academic spin-offs. Second, using the results from two recently conducted surveys, we present an overview of academic spin-offs in Japan. We consider academic spin-offs that entail the transfer of technological, human, and financial resources to be of importance for both the Japanese economy and academics. Knowledge and insights about academic spin-offs in general are available elsewhere (cf. Brett et al., 1991; Feldman, 2003; Lockett et al., 2003; Shane, 2004a; Calson, 2005; Lockett et al., 2005; Lerner, 2005; Phan and Siegel, 2006) , but documentation about spin-offs in Japan has been sparse. 2 It is probably interesting and important for theory and practice to examine the case of Japanese spinoffs in detail, which have been rapidly growing as a result or the recent institutional changes (see Figure 3 ). Third, we assess the progress of the government's strategy for building a nation with strengths in innovation and discuss the potential opportunities and threats for academic spin-offs in Japan.
Previous studies defined academic spin-offs in different ways (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003; Pirnay et al., 2003) . For instance, Shane (2004a) defined a university spin-off as "a new company founded to exploit a piece of intellectual property created in an academic institution"
and viewed it as "a subset of all start-up companies created by the students and employees of academic institutions (p. 4)". In this study, we define academic spin-offs as new ventures founded on the basis of knowledge, inventions, and capabilities generated in academic institutions (see the end of Section 3 for more descriptions). Here, academic institutions refer to organizations registered as universities, colleges, technical junior colleges, or interuniversity research institutes. Using survey results conducted by a university research center at the University of Tsukuba and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), we provide aggregated data that describe the growth and status quo of academic spin-offs in Japan.
Governmental Policies and Institutional Revolutions
Since the mid-1990s, an extensive series of governmental policies has been legislated to promote cross-field research cooperation and technology transfer from academia to the private sector. These revolutions in the legal and political environments have created fertile opportunities for the birth of academic spin-offs by accelerating flexible resource mobilization and the deregulation of traditional researchers' rights and responsibilities in the academic institutions. Table 1 summarizes a brief history of the institutional revolutions for the development of relating to academic spin-offs. As we noted above, the reforms consisted of three stages: (1) the promotion of crossfield research, (2) the transfer of technologies and innovation from the academic institutions to the commercial sectors through licensing, and (3) the creations of academic spin-offs. Along with these stages, the reforms' objectives have expanded. Building a nation with strength in innovation is no longer the sole goal, and, as implied in the Hiranuma Plan, the government expects academic spin-offs to play the critical role in generating new industries, employment, and national wealth.
Two Surveys and an Overview of Academic Spin-offs in Japan
These institutional reforms have created business environments in which researchers in academic institutions found academic spin-offs based upon their innovation, technologies, and capabilities. In the following sections, we assess the development and status quo of academic spin-off activities in Japan by using the results of two surveys conducted by a university research center at the University of Tsukuba and the METI.
ILC survey
One part of the data that we use in this study was collected by the Tsukuba Industrial Liaison The objective of the second-wave survey was to collect firm-level information from university spin-offs identified in the first wave. The second wave asked the spin-offs the types of resources that had been transferred from universities, the magnitudes and types of challenges that they faced in the pre-and post-startup processes, and the support that they received from universities and other external constituents. After removing 52 spin-offs that went bankrupt or were acquired by other corporations, the ILC sent questionnaires to the remaining 1,089 university spin-offs. Of these, 275 returned the questionnaires, yielding the response rates of approximately 25%. This means that we have at most detailed information on 275 spin-off firms.
The ILC did not report any mean-comparison tests useful for checking for any potential bias such as significant differences between responding and nonresponding firms. However, because it is very likely that poorly performing or failing university spin-offs are less likely to respond, the results based on the second wave of the survey reported here should be interpreted with some caution. Regardless of this potential bias, we believe that this is still most likely the best source of data on university spin-offs.
The METI survey
Since 2002 
Early Outcomes: Overview of the Results from the Two Surveys
This section provides an overview of the results from the ILC and METI surveys to advance our understanding of the status quo of academic spin-offs in Japan. First, Table 2 Using the data from the ILC survey, we present a list of the academic institutions with more than nine spin-offs in Table 3 .
=====TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE=====
This table reproduces a finding in Table 2 that national universities offer fertile ground for academic spin-offs in Japan. Of the top 31 universities ranked by the number of spin-offs, 22
were national universities. This table also demonstrates that not many but only some institutions, whether national or private, actively establish spin-offs. Basic Survey by MEXT, we summarize an outlook of higher education in Japan in Table 4 .
=====TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE=====
Of the 87 national and 553 private universities, a total of 61,000 and 89,000 faculties were employed, respectively, suggesting that the private universities tended to have the smaller faculty body. As shown in column IV in Table 4 , the number of faculties per institution for private and national universities was 700 and 162, respectively. Also, column VI indicates that the number of students per faculty in national and private universities was 10.3 and 23.6, respectively, 6 showing the greater teaching load and fewer research resources in private universities.
We compile the results from the two surveys in Table 5 and 6 to show the distributions of spin-offs by business domains and by geographical areas, respectively.
=====TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE=====
5 Previous studies using data from other countries also found this pattern (e.g., Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Shane, 2004a; Landry et al., 2006) . 6 The result is primarily due to the difference in the amounts of national expenditures provided to national and private universities.
Due to the absence of coded data about the industry domains of spin-offs in the ILC survey, we manually classified them by inspecting the reported business descriptions. Caution should also be used in interpreting results about the distributions of business domains from the METI surveys, which double-counted some firms and report the data of more than 1,503 firms. It appears from Table 5 that high-tech areas such as biotechnology, life sciences, information technology (IT), material sciences, and nanotechnology are highly populated by academic spinoffs, suggesting that spin-offs facilitate commercialization and the transfer of the outcomes of basic and advanced research generated in academic institutions. Table 6 shows the high concentration of spin-offs in the metropolitan areas, which is probably due to the concentration of population, economic activities, and even academic institutions in these areas.
Using the reported data and compiling the individual data from the ILC survey, we report more detailed characteristics of academic spin-offs in Table 7 .
=====TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE===== Table 7 reproduces our findings in Table 2 and 3 about the fewer spin-offs from private universities: 86% of private universities had no academic spin-offs, compared with 22% of national universities. It was found that 67% of spin-offs take the business form of stock corporations. The primary forms of relationships of spin-offs with academic institutions entail the transfer of human resources and nonpatented technology, whereas the transfer of patented technology and financing are less prevalent. Table 8 compiles the data from the ILC survey, showing the extent of support that academic institutions provided to spin-offs in the pre-and post-startup processes, indicated by the presence of specialized internal units for supporting spin-offs and that of on-or off-campus incubation facilities.
=====TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE=====
It appears that national universities were more active in providing support to spin-offs, which may lead to our earlier finding about the higher rates of spin-offs from national universities.
Finally, we compiled the data from the ILC second-wave survey and report the current situations of academic spin-offs in Table 9 .
=====TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE=====
The sales of the 205 spin-offs averaged JPY 94.9 million. Of the 205 firms, 22 firms (11%) had no sales. Of the 186 spin-offs that reported profits in the survey, 69 (37%) were in the red and 95 (51%) were in the black. Some 22 (12%) spin-offs had zero profit. The average number of employees was 7.8 with a standard deviation of 11.0. Approximately 30% and 50% of the spinoffs were in the seed and early stages of the venture life cycle, respectively. More than 60% of the spin-offs received support from academic institutions in either the pre-or the post-startup process. In summary, we can conclude that most of the spin-off firms are still premature.
Discussion
Since the implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, university patenting and licensing have proliferated in the US. This policy has been viewed to be successful in promoting the commercialization of research outcomes from academia, even though issues still remain such as conflict of interests, confidentiality, he quality of patents, the distribution of benefits from commercialization (Jaffe and Lerner, 2001; Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Mowery et al., 2004; Shane 2004b; Rosell and Agrawal, 2006) . In the last several decades, the US has celebrated the establishments of more than 5,000 spin-offs since 1980 and observed rapid growth and financial success for some spin-offs, particularly in the high-tech sectors (e.g., AUTM, 2007; Shane, 2004a) . In recent years, approximately 500 academic spin-offs have been founded per year.
To follow the US's remarkable success, the Japanese policy makers have implemented institutional change and formulated new strategies to develop social systems for private and academic collaboration. This resulted in the substantial increase in the number of spin-offs in the last few years. However, further commercialization of intellectual properties requires more efforts in the following areas. First, the further promotion of academic spin-offs requires effective coordination, collaboration, and synergies among government agencies, including the MEXT, the METI, and the Cabinet. The three agencies have different purposes and interests: the MEXT is responsible for policy on education, science, and technology; the METI is in charge of the formulation of industrial policies and so is interested in the promotion of new ventures in general; the Cabinet (i.e., the Intellectual Property Policy Headquarters) has taken the leadership in the strategic development of Japanese intellectual property. As each of the agencies tends to pursue its objectives independently, it is not clear whether efforts by the three agencies are well coordinated to efficiently and effectively stimulate the commercialization of intellectual properties.
Second, faculties engaging in spin-offs need to resolve trade-off problems in allocating their time and resources to research, teaching, and business. There exists no normative environment that strongly supports profit making of faculties through the establishment of spinoffs. No consensus has been established yet as to how faculties should balance their efforts for research and business (Bock, 2003; Mowery et al., 2004; Shane, 2004a) . The lack of consensus often causes internal conflict in academic institutions, where research-oriented faculties may criticize business-oriented faculties for their time-and effort-allocation and demand more internal work for the institutions.
Third, declining birthrate and a growing proportion of elderly people in the Japanese society also pose a critical threat to academic institutions. Figure 4 shows the projected population of Japan until 2055. While the numerical target set in the Hiranuma Plan has been achieved, little is known about problems that more than 1,000 premature spin-offs are now experiencing. The good news is their low failure rates: 4% in the ILC survey and 3% in the METI survey. The bad news, however, is that only 16 of the spin-off firms have gone public as of March, 2006 . We believe that, as a result of a series of legislative changes, the society is now equipped to increase the number of academic spin-offs, but it is time to redirect our attention from quantity to quality and consider strategies for economic prosperity through the use of intellectual properties as well as entrepreneurship. 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Calendar Year year-to-year comparison 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Note: The total number of firms exceeds the 1,503 firms in the METI survey because of classification into more than one business domain. 
